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THE BALANCE OF CONVENIENCE DOCTRINE IN THE
SOUTHEASTERN STATES, PARTICULARLY AS
APPLIED TO WATER
FRANK E. MArO NY*

An article in the August 1952 issue of The National Geographic
Magazine points up the growing importance of water to all of us.
The writer has this to say :1
"Though our average citizen drinks less than half a gallon
of liquid a day, he uses about 1,100 gallons of water daily for
all domestic, agricultural, and industrial purposes, not counting
hydro power ....
"In Texas the population nearly tripled in the 50-year period
ending in 1940, but use of water increased 71 times on an average for all purposes. For industries and municipalities the
increase was 30 times; for irrigation, about 55 times; for water
power, about 85 times."
It has been predicted in the authoritative journal of the American
Water Works Association that ten years from now industrial demand for water will be doubled, but that this doubled demand will
still represent only about 25 to 35 per cent of the total water intake
of the country, since the writer predicts that the demand for other
uses, such as for irrigation and steam power, will correspondingly
increase. 2 We may certainly expect a tremendous increase in industrial demand in the Southeast, since two of our growing industries,
pulp and paper, and steel, lead all others in industrial water requirements ;3 and the use of water for irrigation, while as yet in its
OB.A. 1938, University of Toronto; LL.B. 1942, University of Florida; Graduate Fellow,

Columbia University School of Law, 1950-1951; Chairman of the 1952-1953 Equity Round
Table Council of the Association of American Law Schools; Professor of Law, University
of Florida.

1. Vol. CII, No. 2, p. 269.
2. Wolman, Gharacteristics and Problens of Industrial Water Supply, 44

J. Aid. WATER WORKS ASS'N 279, 280 (1952). The writer is Professor of
Sanitary Engineering at Johns Hopkins University and former Chairman of
the National Water Resources Committee. See also Green, Water Use in
Industry, 43 J. Am. WATER WVORKs Ass'N 591 (1951).
3. See Powell and Bacon, Magnitude of Industrial Demand for Proecss
Water, 42 J. Am. WATER WORKS Ass'N 777, 782 (1950). Wolman, supra note
2, points out that four types of industry, electrical, pulp and paper, petroleum
products, and steel, account for 807o of the total industrial water intake.
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infancy in this region, 4 has already shown signs of rapid and vigorous growth.5
It is apparent that, with this tremendous increase in the amount
of water being used in the Southeast today, serious legal problems
may arise in connection with the distribution of available water
supplies. 6 Now where does the balance of convenience doctrine fit
into this picture? This doctrine has been employed principally as
a limitation upon the availability of one type of sanction used for
the enforcement of water rights -the injunction. Before discussing the effect of the balance of convenience doctrine, therefore, it
will be well to first examine briefly the use of the injunction in water
rights cases to see how important a part that sanction plays in the
enforcement scheme. Next will be considered the historical development of the doctrine in its relationship to the granting of unjunctive
relief. Third, and more important, will come the application of the
doctrine to date in our Southeastern states. Fourth and finally,
realizing that the doctrine has so far been applied in the Southeast
for the most part in cases involving damage through pollution of
water supplies, a study will be made of the place of the balance of
convenience doctrine in relation to the growing problem of regulating the use of water for irrigation and industry in the Southeast.
PLACn Or TH1

DOCTRINE IN

THE SCHEME Or REGULATORY

ENFORCEMENT

What remedies are available for the enforcement of water rights,
and how does the injunction fit into that scheme of remedies? The
remedies may, in general, be divided into two classes: (1) specific
relief through equitable remedies; and (2) actions at law, including, in appropriate cases, the extraordinary remedies of prohibition

4. As of 1950 nearly 95% of the total land irrigated in the United States
was within the area generally referred to as the 17 Western states. See 3
REPORT OF TH4 PRESIDXNT'S WATER RESOURCES PoLIcY COMMISSION, WATER

RrsouRces LAW 152 (1950).

5. See p. 168 infra.
6. The increasing importance of water in the Southeast has already resulted

in considerable examination by our law journals of the legal problems connected with the use of water in this area. See Wilcox, Authority of the State
of Florida over Her Waters, 12 FLA. L. J. 319 (1938); Notes: 3 ALA. L.

REv. 248 (1950) ; Extent of Private Rights in Non-Navigable Lakes, 5 U. OF
FLA. L. REv. 166 (1952); Waters: Surface Water Drainage, 2 U. OF FLA. L.
Riv. 392 (1949); Irrigation in Kentucky as Affected by the Law of Riparian
Rights, 40 Ky. L. 3. 423 (1952); The Rule in Kentucky as to Surface Water,
35 Ky. L. J. 86 (1946); Rights and Remedies in the Law of Stream Pollution,
35 VA. L. Rtv. 774 (1949).
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1
and quo warranto
and actions in ejectment,8 but primarily the common law action for damages. 9 In those relatively few cases in which
there is a contract between the parties specific relief may be had by
way of specific performance, 10 and the balance of convenience doctrine is incidentally applicable to those cases. 11 The majority of
the cases, however, sound in tort, and the preferred type of relief
against such torts is by way of injunction rather than action for
damages.' 2 The primary reason for this preference is that injunctive relief is preventive. It can furnish relief before, instead
of after, a threatened violation. Moreover, in many cases involving
water rights preventive relief by way of injunction may be the only
effective sanction, because an action for damages will, if successful,
result in such a small judgment as to be valuable only as a means

7. A discussion of these extraordinary remedies is beyond the scope of this

article. They are covered in detail in 3 KINNEY, IRRIGATION AND WATER RIGHTS
(1912); see §§ 1649 (mandamus), 1651 (prohibition), 1653 (quo warranto).
In general, mandamus may be used in appropriate cases to compel a water
company to furnish water for irrigation, or to compel a state engineer or water
commissioner to distribute water as provided by law. Prohibition may be used
when an inferior court wrongfully takes jurisdiction of a water dispute. Quo
warranto may be used to test the validity of reclamation or irrigation districts,
or to annul the franchise of a water company that improperly fails to supply
water as required by its charter.
8. This action may be useful to prevent the unlawful exclusion of a riparian
owner from the use of a stream. Glassell v. Hansen, 135 Cal. 547, 67 Pac. 964
(1902); see 3 KINNEY, IRRIGATION AND WATER RIGHTS § 1654 (1912).
9. Again, coverage of this remedy is beyond the scope of this article.
Kinney devotes approximately 100 pages to this subject, 3 KINNEY, IRRIGATION
AND WATaR RIciTS 3052-3146 (1912). In addition to these actions at law,
there is often the possibility of enforcement through criminal prosecution, id.
§ 1657. This possibility does not, however, preclude a civil action for equitable
or legal relief. People v. Trukee Lumber Co., 116 Cal. 397, 48 Pac. 374
(1897); accord, Murphy v. United States, 272 U. S. 630 (1926); Pompano
Horse Club v. State, 93 Fla. 415, 111 So. 801 (1927) ; see Note, 2 U. or FLA.
L. REv. 250 (1949).
10. Thus specific performance may be had of a contract by a water company
to supply water for irrigation. Ulrich v. Pateros Water Ditch Co.. 67 Wash.
328, 121 Pac. 818 (1912).
Since the water is generally not available elsewhere, the remedy at law is inadequate in these cases and the equitable remedy
is accordingly available. See 3 KINNEY, IRRIGATION AND WATER RIGHTS
§ 1650 (1912).
11. Taylor v. Florida E. C. R. R., 54 Fla. 635, 45 So. 574 (1907); Rockhill
Club v. Volker, 331 Mo. 947, 56 S. W. 2d 9 (1932). "Public interest, therefore, must always be carefully appraised when it really has a place in cases of
specific performance," GLENN AND REDDEN, CASES ON EQUITY 537 n. (1946).
12. Since injunctive relief is equitable in nature, it is necessary to establish
a basis for equity jurisdiction in these cases. This basis is easily found, however, since water rights have long been regarded as a type of real property
right and hence the subject of equitable protection as a matter of course. See
3 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY 117 (3d ed. 1939); 1 WIEL,, WATER RIGHTS T
THE WESTERN STATES 20-21 (3d ed. 1911).
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of preventing the gaining of a prescriptive right by the defendant,13
whereas an injunction may completely stop the violation. In addition, the damages that could be obtained in an action at law can
be obtained as an adjunct of the specific relief given in an injunctive
suit.

14

Having seen the importance of the injunction in the enforcement
scheme, it is now appropriate to examine the relationship of the
balance of convenience doctrine to the granting of injunctive relief.
In this connection it should first be realized that this doctrine is
simply one of a group of limitations on the use of the injunction.
The next question is, what are those limitations and to what extent does their application lie within the discretion of the court in
which injunctive relief is being sought?15 In addition to the balance
of convenience doctrine, they include the doctrine of laches;16 the
refusal of injunctive relief when the court recognizes that the injunction is being sought primarily to be used as a club for the purpose of extorting an exorbitant settlement from the defendant violator ;17 and the application of the de inihimis principle, 18 under which
in some jurisdictions the court may refuse to grant equitable relief
when no substantial damage is alleged or proved, leaving the complainant to his action for damages at law to prevent the running of
the prescription period. 19
13. WALSH, TREATISE ON EQUITY 178-182 (1930); see Wiel, Injunction
without Damages as Illustrated by a Point in the Law of Waters, 5 CAL. L.
REv. 199 (1917); see Webb v. Portland Mfg. Co., 29 Fed. Cas. 506, No. 17,322
(C. C. D. Me. 1838).
14. Abbott v. The 76 Land and Water Co., 161 Cal. 42, 118 Pac. 425 (1911);
WALSH, supra note 13, at 179-180.
15. One such limitation is found in all jurisdictions in the interlocutory injunction cases when it is universally recognized that the trial court can refuse
to grant an injunction pendente lite in the absence of a showing that a refusal
of injunctive relief at this stage in the proceedings will work serious hardship
on the complainant. Boatwright v. Town of Leighton, 231 Ala. 607, 166 So.
418 (1936); Sanders v. Textile Workers Organizing Committee, 187 S. Car.
66, 196 S. R. 543 (1938) ; 5 POMEROY, EQUITABLE JURISPRUDENcE and EQUITABLE RmiEDnsS § 1949 (4th ed. 1919).
16. Under this doctrine a complainant may be refused injunctive relief if he
has slept on his rights while defendant acted to his prejudice, as, for example.
by preparing expensive works for the use of the water in question. New
York City v. Pine, 185 U. S. 93 (1902); accord, Brooks v. Patterson, 159
Fla. 263, 31 So. 2d 472 (1947).
17. Edwards v. Allouez Mining Co., 38 Mich. 46 (1878); McCann v. Chasm
Power Co., 211 N. Y. 301, 105 N. E. 416 (1914) ; cf. Platte Valley Irr. Dist.
v. Tilley, 142 Neb. 122, 5 N. W. 2d 252 (1942).
18. De niniinis non curat lex (The law does not concern itself with trifles),
McCann v. Chasm Power Co., 211 N. Y. 301, 105 N. E. 416 (1914). Contra:
Gering Irr. Dist. v. Mitchell Irr. Dist., 141 Neb. 344, 3 N. W. 2d 566 (1942).
19. McCann v. Chasm Power Co., 211 N. Y. 301, 105 N. E. 416 (1914);
cf. Chow v. Santa Barbara, 217 Cal. 673, 22 P. 2d 5 (1933). Contra: Amsterdam Knitting Co. v. Dean, 162 N. Y. 278, 56 N. E. 757 (1900) ; Mann v.
Willey, 51 App. Div. 169, 64 N. Y. Supp. 589 (3d Dep't 1900), aff'd, 168 N. Y.
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The most important limitation on preventive relief for our purposes, however, is the balance of convenience doctrine. What is
this doctrine? It is difficult to define, since many varying factors
are involved in its application in different cases. The language of
Mr. Justice Brandeis in a 1933 nuisance case, however, may provide
a key to its general meaning. In Harrisowuillev. Dickey Clay Manufacturing Company he states :20
"For an injunction is not a remedy which issues as of course.
Where substantial redress can be afforded by the payment of
money and issuance of an injunction would subject the defendant to grossly disproportionate hardship, equitable relief may
be denied although the nuisance is indisputable."
In other words, in jurisdictions applying the doctrine, an injunction
does not necessarily follow in all cases in which a legal right is
violated. The problem will be to determine in what type of water
right cases injunctive relief may be or is likely to be withheld.
HISToRIcAiL DEVELOPMENT

The adoption of the term "balance of convenience" was perhaps
unfortunate. Its use has in the past resulted in criticism on the
21
ground that courts should deal in legal rights, not conveniences,
and the very idea of balancing conveniences has been rejected by
some courts as something beyond the judicial power. In fact the
American Law Institute would have us drop the term "conveniences"
and talk instead of balancing "injuries" on grounds of "relative
hardship". 22 Whether this change in terminology will in itself make
the doctrine more palatable to members of the imperative school of
jurisprudence is to be doubted, but the trend toward the acceptance
of the balancing of equities doctrine by American courts has been
quite widespread during the past several decades. 28 This shift is
664, 61 N. E. 1131 (1901). It is interesting to note that in cases of interference with riparian rights, as in trespass cases, damage is presumed from the
interference, so that the action for damages will lie without proof of actual
injury, and likewise the period of prescriptive user begins to run when the use
commences, regardless of its effect on the lower owner. Cape v. Thompson,
21 Tex. Civ. App. 681, 53 S. W. 368 (1899); 2 FARN

M, WATMRS AND

XVATER RIGHTS § 541a (1904) ; see Lewis, Injunctions Against Nuisances and
the Rule Requiring the Plaintiff to Establish his Right at Law, 56 U. or PA.
L. REv. 289, 311 n. (1908).
20. 289 U. S. 334, 337, 338 (1933).
21. See McClintock, Discretion to Deny Injunction, against Trespass and
Nuisance, 12 MIN. L. Rzv. 565, 569 (1928) ; Note, The Trend -To Balance
the Injuries, 4 S. CAR. L. Q. 540 (1952).
22. R STAT2,mNT, TORTS § 941, comment a (1939).

23. See Storey v. Central Hide & Rendering Co., 148 Tex. 509, 515, 226
S. IV. 2d 615, 619 (1950); Note, 4 S. CM. L. Q. 540, 542 (1952).
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probably the result of a change in the attitude of the courts themselves from a laissez faire philosophy, with its emphasis on strict
protection of real property rights, -4 toward a jurisprudential approach along the lines of Dean Pound's theory of social interests, 2 5
an approach which recognizes the importance of social interests other
than real property rights, or what Dean Pound refers to as the
security of acquisitions, and likewise recognizes the necessity of
balancing these social interests when they conflict, with preference
being given to those interests that weigh most heavily in our present civilization. 26 An examination of the balance of convenience
cases over the past century shows a similar trend.
Forgetting that the English chancery court in its inception acted
as a balance against the overly technical application of common law
rules, much as Aristotle's epieikeia or equity was designed "as a
correction of law, where law is defective by reason of its universality",2 7 the nineteenth century chancellors, succumbing to the demands
of predictability, pushed the principle of epieikcia into the background, leading to what Dean Pound characterized in 1905 as the
decadence of equity.2 8

During this period the idea that the chan-

cellor could balance the relative hardships of the parties, even when
a strong public interest dictated such a course, was usually rejected.29
As Pomeroy stated at this time, "The weight of authority is against
allowing a balance of injury as a means of determining the proprie-

t,of issuing an injunction".3 0

While the majority of the cases rejecting the balancing doctrine
were in the field of nuisance, there were a number of water rights
cases, particularly in the pollution area, which took the same strict
position. 31 It is interesting to note, however, that most of these
24, Thus Locke took the position that governments exist solely for the protection of property. Locim, SEcoND TRE .rsE OF Civir. GovRxNlMXT 122, 168
(Hafner ed. 1947).
25. Pound, A Survey of Social Interests, 57 HAzy. L. RE%. 1 (1943); see
Patterson, Pound's Theory of Social Interests, in SAYRE, INTRPRETATIONS OF
MODERN LEGAL Pmr.osopHrEs 558-573 (1947).
26. See PATrIRsON, AN INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE 290 (3d Mimeo

ed. 1949).
27. ARISTOTL.E, ETHIcs, Bk. V, 10, 1137b (Chase's trans., Everyman ed.
1911).
28. Pound, The Decadence of Equity, 5 CoL. L. REV. 20 (1905).
29. Whalen v. Union Bag Co., 208 N. Y. 1, 101 N. E. 805 (1913); Walters
v. McElroy, 151 Pa. 549, 25 Atl. 125 (1892).
30. 5 POM.fEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE and EQUITABLE REMEDIES § 530 (3d
ed. 1905).
31. Woodruff v. North Bloomfield Gravel Mining Co., 18 Fed. 753 (C. C. D.
Cal. 1884) ; Arizona Copper Co. v. Gillespie, 12 Ariz. 190, 100 Pac. 465 (1909) ;
Whalen v. Union Bag Co., 208 N. Y. 1, 101 N. E. 805 (1913). In Hill v.
Standard Mining Co., 12 Idaho 223, 231, 85 Pac. 907, 908 (1906), it was said:
"It is earnestly urged by counsel for respondents that . . . it [an injunction]
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so-called majority decisions were handed down in the industrial
North and West, whereas three of our Southeastern States, Alabama,32 Kentucky, 33 and North Carolina, 34 early joined what one
writer referred to as the "weak minority",3 5 denying relief in the
absence of substantial injury to the complainant.

Today, especially in code jurisdictions in which it is recognized
that injunctive relief is simply one among available remedies and
therefore its denial is not necessarily a bar to other relief, the concept that the court has a discretionary power to balance the equities
when determining whether to grant the injunction is again coming
into ascendancy, 36 with the American Law Institute leading the way
in endorsing this development away from the mechanical jurisprudence of the late nineteenth century.3 7
APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE TO WATER CASES
IN THE SOUTHEAST

Has the trend toward flexibility in the granting of injunctive relief been exemplified in water cases in the Southeastern states? In
attempting to answer this question it may be well to consider the
types of water rights which are subject to equitable protection. Such
rights may exist in either subterranean or surface water, and these
rights may be interfered with either by pollution 38 or by diversion,
would result in 'the depopulation of Shoshone County, the abandonment of all
mining and milling therein, and the consequent bankruptcy of the inhabitants
thereof'. Deplorable as this might be-if true-it furnishes no excuse for the
court to shirk its responsibilities in disposing of the question before us on its
merits. The law is no respector of persons, corporations or individuals, and in
its creation and enforcement reaches out and protects the lone settler in his
rights, let them be ever so meager .... The law does not measure the rights of
litigants by the amount involved, nor the manner in which it may affect others
not parties to the litigation".
32. Clifton Iron Co. v. Dye, 87 Ala. 468, 6 So. 192 (1889) (refusal of the
injunction was also justified on the basis of laches) ; Ulbricht v. Eufaula Water
Co., 86 Ala. 587, 6 So. 78 (1889).
33. Louisville & N. Ry. v. Beauchamp, 19 Ky. L. Rep. 398, 40 S. W. 679
(1897) (judgment for damages reversed in absence of showing of injury from
diversion of water).
34. Harris v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 153 N. C. 542, 69 S. E. 623 (1910) (judgment for defendant in action for damages affirmed in absence of material injury from diversion).
35. Comment, 4 TEx. L. Rv. 231, 232 (1926).
But the leading writer in
the field of water rights at the time favored this minority view, 3 KINNEY,
IRRIGATION AND WATER RIGHTs 3016 (1912).
36. See Note, The Trend -To
Balance the Injuries, 4 S. CAR. L. Q. 540

(1952).

37. RESTATtmgNT, ToRTs § 933 and introductory note to c. 48 (1939).
38. For a survey of the present extent of this problem see Water Pollution
in the United States, Ser. 1, U. S. Pub. Health Serv. Pub. No. 64 (1951).
See also Note, Rights and Remedies in the Law of Stream Pollution, 35 VA.

L. Rxv. 774 (1949).
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detention, or appropriation of the water to which complainant lays
a claim of right. As yet the injunction has not been widely used
in the Southeast for the protection of rights in subterranean water
supplies, though the conservation of such supplies is becoming a
real problem ;39 but it has been sought in many cases to prevent pollution of surface waters, and there are a scattering of Southeastern
cases involving the use of the remedy as a means of preventing diversion or appropriation of such waters.
POLLUTION CAsEs

In the pollution cases public interest often bulks large, since the
offenders are usually municipalities or large industries intimately
tied in with the economy of the jurisdiction; and in cases of this
sort we should not be too surprised to find the courts refusing to
grant an injunction the result of which would be to shut down an
important industry or leave a city without a means of sewage disposal. The fact that a municipality, if enjointed, might obtain a right
to continue its pollution through eminent domain proceedings is of
course a factor in some of the decisions to balance the equities; but,
even in the case of private defendants, if the public interest in continued operation is strong enough the injunction has usually been
denied in the more recent cases. Thus we find the Alabama Supreme Court in a 1952 case refusing to sanction injunctive relief
against pollution by a limestone company on a complaint of interference by agricultural interests;40 a 1940 Arkansas case denying
injunctive relief against pollution of a stream by a barium mill;41
a 1940 Florida case balancing the equities in favor of allowing a
municipality to continue polluting a stream through operation of
a sewage disposal plant;42 and a 1934 Louisiana case refusing to
39. See Black and Eidsness, Industrial Water Supply in Florida, Economic

Leaflets, Univ. of Fla., Vol. XI, No. 2, Jan. 1952. The authors point out
that, while industry in the United States uses daily 25,000,000,000 gallons of
water, of which only 5,000,000,000 gallons is ground water, Florida's two largest
water-using industries, the pulp and paper mills and the phosphate industry, derive most of their water supply from wells. Because of Florida's tremendous
ground water supply, no overall shortage is likely to occur, but extensive
pumping of ground water may cause local shortages and concurrent legal problems. Thus withdrawals by the phosphate industry in Polk County have resulted in completely drying up Kissengen Springs, which previously had an
average flow of approximately 20,000,000 gallons per day. Ibid. See Springs
of Florida, Fla. Geological Bull. No. 31, p. 142 (1947).
40. Montgomery Limestone Co. v. Bearden, 256 Ala. 269, 54 So. 2d 571 (1951).
41. Smith v. Magnet Cove Barium Corp., 212 Ark. 491, 206 S. W. 2d 442
(1947).
42. Lakeland v. Harris, 143 Fla. 761, 197 So. 470 (1940). The Court in this
case did order the municipality to take all feasible measures to cut down the
amount of pollution.
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enjoin the operation of a paper mill despite resulting stream pollu48
tion.
DIVERSION AND APPROPRIATION CASES

In the diversion and appropriation cases there is evidence of a
similar trend toward balancing the relative hardships in determining
whether injunctive relief should be granted, though with some reservations. Again, if the public interest intervenes, as when a municipal water supply is involved, the tendency, as evidenced in a 1934
Kentucky case, 44 is to refuse injunctive relief and leave the complainant to his remedy by way of damages, though some jurisdictions, including Virginia, have stayed injunctive relief only on condition that the municipality proceed to obtain the needed water rights
through eminent domain proceedings. 45
When only private parties are involved, however, and the basic
interest of the public is not apparent, our courts have been much
more reluctant to consider the possibility of balancing the equities;
46
and West Virginia 47
and in cases of this sort both the Georgia
courts have taken a strong position against the right of the court to
weigh the relative hardships. It seems only fair to add, however,
that West Virginia, along with South Carolina, 48 still apparently
considers herself bound by the traditional imperative approach which
denies the court's power to balance the equities in any case in which
injunctive relief is applied for,49 whether that case involves the in43. Young v. International Paper Co., 179 La. 803, 155 So. 231 (1934) ; cf.
National Container Corp. v. State, 138 Fla. 32, 189 So. 4 (1939) (same result
accomplished on different legal basis).
44. Kentucky Elec. Devel. Co. v. Wells, 256 Ky. 203, 75 S. W. 2d 1088
(1934).
45. Purcellville v. Potts, 179 Va. 514, 19 S. E. 2d 700 (1942) ; accord, Mayor
of Baltimore v. Brack, 175 Md. 615, 3 A. 2d 471 (1939); Hartzell v. Village
of Hambury, 155 Misc. 345, 279 N. Y. Supp. 650 (Sup. Ct. 1935), aff'd, 248
App. Div. 667, 289 N. Y. Supp. 910 (4th Dep't), modified, 272 N. Y. 234, 5
N. E. 2d 801, modified, 273 N. Y. 476, 6 N. E. 2d 411 (1936).
46. Robertson v. Arnold, 182 Ga. 664, 186 S. E. 806 (1936) ; City of Elberton v. Hobbs, 121 Ga. 749, 49 S. . 779 (1905); Chestatee Pyrites Co. v.
Cavenders Creek Gold Mining Co., 118 Ga. 255, 45 S. E. 267 (1903).
47. McCausland v. Jarrell, 68 S. E. 2d 729 (IV. Va. 1951). The court does
say that it will balance the equities in an appropriate case, but on the facts as
brought out in the dissenting opinion it would be hard to find a more appropriate case.
48. Davis v. Palmetto Quarries Co., 212 S. C. 496, 48 S. E. 2d 329 (1948);
Williams v. Haile Gold Mining Co., 85 S. C. 1, 66 S. E. 117 (1909) ; State v.
Columbia Water Power Co., 82 S. C. 181, 63 S. E. 884 (1909). For recent
dicta that the court may balance the equities in an appropriate case see Forest
Land Co. v. Black, 216 S. C. 255, 266, 57 S. E. 2d 420, 426 (1950); Sprouse
v. Winston, 212 S. C. 176, 185, 46 S. E. 2d 874, 878 (1948).
49. Board of Comm'rs v. Elm Grove Mining Co., 122 W. Va. 442, 9 S. E. 2d
813 (1940) ; Ritz v. Woman's Club, 114 W. Va. 675, 173 S. E. 564 (1934) (both
cases admit the possibility of using the doctrine in an extremely meritorious
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vasion of water rights or any other tort against which injunctive relief may be sought.5 0
PLANNING VOR THE FUTUR"

With the advent of modern portable irrigation systems and pump-

ing machinery, the possibilities for utilizing available water supplies
in the Southeast have increased tremendously. Whereas in the past
we have generally considered our water resources to be more than
adequate, we may now be approaching a situation where our supply
will fall short of meeting the demands placed upon it. In this new
situation new means must be devised to handle the legal problems
involved in obtaining maximum benefits from the water available
to us.
To point up the growing seriousness of this problem, it may be
appropriate to examine some recent developments in Kentucky and
South Carolina. Data gathered in Kentucky by the United States
Weather Bureau shows that in only two out of every five years is the
rainfall so distributed as to produce a good crop yield.51 In the
other three the crop yield can be increased tremendously by irrigation. For instance, in 1951, which was not considered a drought
year, farmers who used irrigation were able to double their tobacco
yield as well as greatly improve the quality of their crop.5 2 Since
the amount of acreage that can be placed in tobacco is rigidly controlled by federal regulations, the practice of irrigating to increase
crop yield will no doubt mushroom rapidly. A recent South Carolina survey shows that in that state demand for water for industrial
uses has increased fourfold since 1945, and the demand for agricul-

case).

One early Georgia case indicates that the court considers itself to
have some discretion to balance the equities, at least in the limited situation in
which the evidence of complainant and defendant is in practical equipoise,
Everett v. Tabor, 119 Ga. 128, 46 S. E. 72 (1903).
50. In Mississippi, on the other hand, while the doctrine has apparently not
yet been considered in connection with water cases, dicta in several recent decisions indicate a more liberal approach toward it in appropriate cases; see
Smith v. Fairchild, 193 Miss. 536, 547, 10 So. 2d 172, 174 (1942) ; Williams v.
Montgomery, 184 Miss. 547, 556, 186 So. 302, 304 (1939); Reber v. Illinois
Cent. R. R., 161 Miss. 885, 898, 138 So. 574, 577 (1932). Early North Carolina and Tennessee cases indicate that those states may also be prepared to take
a liberal stand on the application of the doctrine. See Brown v. Carolina
C. R. R., 83 N. C. 128 (1880) ; Lassater v. Garrett, 63 Tenn. 291, 4 BAX*. 368
(1874).
51. Note, 40 Ky. L. J. 424 (1952), quoting Thaxton, Irrigation Study on
Pastures in Kentucky, Feb. 17, 1951.
52. Ibid.
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tural purposes has doubled in the same period.5 3 Similar figures
54
might be produced for most of our other Southeastern states.
PRESENT STATE OF AmERiCA_

LAW

Before discussing possible solutions of this problem of obtaining
maximum use of available water supplies, it may be well to consider
the three different judicial approaches to use of water from running
streams.5 5 The oldest is the English "natural flow" rule, under which
an upper riparian owner may not alter the natural flow of a stream
except in so far as he makes use of the water for purely domestic
purposes. This approach was introduced into Anglo-American law
through the writings of Kent and Story.50 It was adopted in England at a time when the use of water for industry and irrigation was
still on a very minor scale, and prevention of damage to streams
through pollution was the predominant problem.57 In such an
economy the rule was adequate to meet the social problems of the
time. This natural flow rule received early accelitance in the eastern United States5 8 but was almost at once rejected in the Western
and Rocky MAountain states in favor of the second doctrine, that of
"prior appropriation".
Under the prior appropriation doctrine, which had its inception
in the needs of the early gold miners for large quantities of water
to carry on their operations,5 9 a riparian or other owner could "ap53. See BUSBY, THt BENEFICIAL USE OF WATER IN SOUTH CAROLINA, A
PRELIMINARY REPORT 6 (1952).
54. See Black and Bidsness, supra note 39.
55. For a more detailed discussion of these three theories relative to the use
of water from watercourses see Busby, stpra p. 106, particularly pp. 107-109.
56. The first authoritative statement of the rule is found in the opinion of
Mr. Justice Story in Tyler v. Wilkinson, 24 Fed. Cas. 472, No. 14,312 (C. C.
C. R. I. 1827). Story's decision was buttressed by Kent a year later in 3
See Wiel, Waters: American Law and
KENT'S Comm. 353 et seq. (1828).
French Authority, 33 HARv. L. Rrv. 133 (1919). For a recent Supreme Court
case outlining the background of the doctrine, see United States v. Gerlach
Live Stock Co., 339 U. S. 725, 744-745 (1950).
57. Mason v. Hill, 5 B. & Adol. 1, 110 Eng. Rep. 692 (1833); Wood v.
Waud, 3 Ex. 784, 154 Eng. Rep. 1047 (1849); Miner v. Gilmour, 12 Moore
C. P. 131, 14 Eng. Rep. 861 (1358); see Wiel, supra note 56, at 144-146.
58. Stein v. Burden, 29 Ala. 127 (1856) ; Roberts v. Martin, 72 W. Va. 92,
77 S. E. 535 (1913). The Alabama court quickly shifted its emphasis to the
reasonable use aspect of Kent's theory; see Ulbricht v. Eufaula Water Co., 86
Ala. 587, 6 So. 78 (1889). West Virginia now apparently also stresses that
aspect; see McCausland v. Jarrell, 68 S. E. 2d 729, 740 (W. Va. 1951). But
the natural flow rule has also recently been reiterated in some of our Southeastern states, Robertson v. Arnold, 182 Ga. 664, 186 S. . 806 (1936) ; Purcellville v. Potts, 179 Va. 514, 19 S. E. 2d 700 (1942); ef. Harris v. Norfolk &
Western Ry., 153 N. C. 542, 69 S. R. 623 (1910).
59. POmEROY, RIPARIAN RIGHS §§ 14-15 (1887); see Wiel, Fifty Years of
Water Law, 50 HARe.L. REv. 252, 254 (1936).
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propriate" the right to use as much water as he could successfully
divert and beneficially employ, so long as his appropriation was prior
to that of others, in which case his right, on a sort of first-come,
first-served basis, might in an extreme case extend to exhausting the
flow of the stream. 60 This doctrine is now confirmed by legislation
in most Western states. 61
The third approach is through the theory of "reasonable use",
under which a riparian complainant is entitled to protection only
when defendant's diversion unreasonably interferes with complainant's use of the water. 62 Under this doctrine emphasis is placed
on full use of the available water supply, and each riparian owner
is entitled to make beneficial use of the water for any purpose to
the extent that his use does not unreasonably interfere with the beneficial uses of others.
POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

The problem of obtaining maximum use of available water supplies in the Southeastern states can be met in two ways. The first
way, suggested in the South Carolina Preliminary Report, 63 is
through legislative repudiation of the antiquated natural flow theory
and the substitution in its stead of the doctrine of prior appropriation
under the direction and control of a state administrative agency.64
60. 44 COL. L. REV. 437, 438 (1944).
61. For excellent summaries of the water law doctrines of the 17 Western

states, with constitutional and statutory citations, see 3

REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S WATER RESOURCES POLICY COMInssIoN, WATER RESOURCES LAW, App.

3 (1950).

62. See 4 RESTATEurNT, TORTS C.41, Topic 3, Scope Note (1939). For a
recent southeastern application of the doctrine see Dunlap v. Carolina Power
& Light Co., 212 N. C. 814, 195 S. E. 43 (1938).

63. See BUSBY, THE BENEFICIAL USE OF WATER IN SOUTH
PRELmINARY REPORT (1952).

CAROLINA, A

64. See Busby, supra note 63, at 51-52. Such legislation would probably include provisions for injunctive enforcement. Would the balance of convenience
doctrine be applicable as a discretionary judicial check on this enforcement
machinery? The Texas court has held in Biggs v. Red Bluff Water Power
Control Dist., 131 S.W. 2d 274 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939), a case involving the
enforcement of an anti-pollution statute, that the court cannot refuse relief "on
equitable considerations". In other words, the discretion provided by the balance of convenience doctrine has no place in injunctive law enforcement. But
the Tennessee court in a series of nuisance cases has held that when a statute
provides for an injunction or damages the court has the authority to balance the
hardships and deny injunctive relief, leaving the complainant to his alternative
statutory remedy by way of damages. Madison v. Ducktown Sulphur, Copper
& Iron Co., 113 Tenn. 331, 83 S.W. 658 (1904); Union Planters' Bank &
Trust Co. v. Memphis Hotel Co., 124 Tenn. 649, 139 S.W. 715 (1911). As
yet this problem as to the existence of judicial discretion has apparently not
been faced by our courts in connection with the enforcement of legislation affecting the use of water. It is submitted that when the problem does arise
adoption of the more liberal view of the Tennessee court in the nuisance cases
would be most in consonance with the modern balance of convenience problem
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This approach may provide the most feasible solution in those jurisdictions, such as South Carolina, that have apparently rejected the
balance of convenience doctrine as a means of preventing injunctions
against minor violations of riparian rights.6 5
There is a second approach possible in those jurisdictions in which
the balance of convenience doctrine is available and the law concerning appropriation of surface waters is not too rigidly bound up with
the early common law rule that all riparian owners are entitled to
the natural flow of a stream, whether they have any need for such
flow or not. This is to settle such disputes on the basis of the doctrine of reasonable use, which affords the upper owner the right
to a beneficial use when there is no appreciable damage to the lower
owner,66 or in some cases when the lower owner is damaged but the
overwhelming utility of the competing use militates against cutting
off that use. 67 A sensible application of the balance of convenience
doctrine may be a very useful adjunct in the development and application of the reasonable use rule in those jurisdictions that are free
to adopt it.
LESSONS VROM fDERAL LAW

it may help to examine briefly the development of the law as applied by the Supreme Court of the United States in cases involving
disputes over the use of water in interstate streams. This examination should be doubly rewarding, since the remedy sought in the

in the Southeast But if the question should arise as a result of an administrative request for injunctive enforcement of an agency order, the discretion of the
agency may replace the traditional discretion of the enforcing court. This presents a problem beyond the scope of this article. See DAvIs, ADmINISTRATmv
LAW § 240 (1951).

65. See note 48 supra. In this connection, however, a judicious application of
the de ininimis principle might provide the court with some discretion in such
cases.
66. This doctrine was developed from one aspect of the natural flow rule as
enunciated by Story and Kent, and the first American case applying the reasonable use doctrine cites Story's opinion in Tyler v. Wilkinson, 24 Fed. Cas. 472,
473, No. 14,312 (C. C. C. R. I. 1827) and KNT'S Co imnI~ rlSs
as authorities, Elliot v. Fitchburg R. R., 10 Cush. 191, 196 (Mass. 1852). See note
56, mpra. The doctrine has been recently restated in Dunlap v. Carolina
Power & Light Co., 212 N. C. 814, 195 S. E. 43 (1938).
67. Dumont v. Kellogg, 29 Mich. 420 (1874) (stream depletion from erection
of dam); Minnesota Loan & Trust Co. v. St. Anthony Falls Water Power Co.,
82 Minn. 505, 85 N. W. 520 (1901) (minor change in channel below dam);
Snow v. Parsons, 28 Vt. 459 (1856) (tanbark residue from tannery discharged
into stream). See 3 REPORT OF Trt PRESIDENT'S WATER RrsoURCFS POLICY
CoMmissiox, WATER REsouRCEs LAW 161-162 (1950), to the effect that the
recent legislative trend in ground water law is toward the adoption of the
reasonable use doctrine.
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great majority of interstate suits has been the injunction 6s and the
Supreme Court has frequently applied the balance of convenience
doctrine in working out its concepts of the law as applied to the use
69
of interstate waters.
The Supreme Court has usually handled such cases on the basis
of equitable apportionment, a doctrine closely allied to that of reasonable use. As Mir. Justice Holmes put it in the case of New Jersey v70
New York,
"A river is more than an amenity, it is a treasure. It offers
a necessity of life that must be rationed among those who have
power over it . . The different traditions and practices in
different parts of the country may lead to varying results but
the effort always is to secure an equitable apportionment without
quibbling over formulas."
If the dispute is between states following the prior appropriation
doctrine the Court has felt free to apply that doctrine in the settlement of the dispute, 71 but even in cases of this sort the Court does
not consider itself bound by the municipal law of such states 72 and
has turned to the equitable apportionment doctrine in cases in which
68. Kansas v. Colorado, 320 U. S.383 (1943); Wyoming v. Colorado, 29&
U. S. 573 (1936) ; Washington v. Oregon, 297 U. S. 517 (1936) ; Arizona v.
California, 283 U. S. 423 (1931); New Jersey v. New York, 283 U. S. 336.
(1931); Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U. S. 660 (1931); Wisconsin v.
Illinois, 281 U. S. 179 (1930); Wisconsin v. Illinois, 278 U. S.367 (1929);
Tennessee v. Arkansas, 249 U. S. 588 (1919); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U. S.
46 (1907) ; Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U. S. 496 (1906); Kansas v. Colorado,
185 U. S. 125 (1902) ; Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U. S. 208 (1901) ; South Carolina v. Georgia, 93 U. S.4 (1876). 69. Application of the doctrine appears evident in the following cases, though
the doctrine is not always referred to by the Court: Kansas v. Colorado, 320'
U. S.383 (1943); Washington v. Oregon, 297 U. S.517 (1936); New Jersey
v. New York, 283 U. S.336 (1931) ; Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U. S.
660 (1931); Wisconsin v. Illinois, 281 U. S. 179 (1930) ; Kansas v. Colorado,
206 U. S. 46 (1907); Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U. S. 496 (1906); Kansas v.
Colorado, 185 U. S. 125 (1902).
See also 3
70. New Jersey v. New York, 283 U. S. 336, 342-343 (1931).
REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S WATER RESOURCES POLICY COMfMISSION, WATza
REsouRcEs LAW 58-64 (1950).
71. Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U. S. 419 (1922). The argument supporting
the application of the doctrine is found at p. 470.
72. As the Court put it in a dispute between Connecticut and Massachusetts,
both of which recognized the natural flow theory, "For the decision of suits
between States, federal, state and international law is considered and applied
by this court as the exigencies of the particular case may require. The determination of the relative rights of contending states in respect of the use of
streams flowing through them does not depend upon the same considerations
and is not governed by the same rules of law that are applied in such states
for the solution of similar questions of private right . . . . And, while the
municipal law relating to like questions between individuals is to be taken
into account, it is not to be deemed to have controlling weight". Connecticut
v. Massachusetts, 282 U. TS. 660, 670 (1931).
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it considered that this doctrine provided a more equitable basis for
the settlement of the dispute. The most recent of these cases is
Kansas v. Colorado,73 decided in 1943. The Court applied this version of the reasonable use doctrine and balanced the equities in favor
of allowing Colorado to continue diversion of a considerable portion
of the Arkansas River when Kansas failed to show that such diversion substantially injured Kansas users.7 4
Although these federal cases are of persuasive value only in most
intrastate controversies as to the right to divert and use stream waters,
it is well to remember that if the water in question is being diverted
from a navigable stream the Federal Government rather than the
state may have the last say as to the continuance of the diversion.
If the appropriation affects the navigability of an interstate stream
it may be enjoined at the behest of the United States ;75 and this is
true even though the proposed diversion is in the non-navigable
upper reaches of the stream. 76 Authority to allow diversion of the
waters of such streams rests with the Secretary of the Army, and
it is apparently within his discretion to say how much of the water
of navigable streams may be diverted." 7 In these cases, therefore,
the discretion of the Secretary replaces the discretion of the chancellor.
If the stream, though navigable, lies wholly within a state, the mere
fact of navigability does not vest jurisdiction in the Secretary, and
the waters of the stream are subject to the state's control until the
Federal Government specifically assumes jurisdiction through Congressional legislation asserting the reserved authority of the Federal
Government over intrastate navigable streams.78 One reason for
assumption of federal authority over intrastate navigable streams is
for flood control purposes, 79 as, for example, the present Central
and Southern Florida Flood Control Project.80 Irrigation water
73. 320 U. S.383 (1943).
74. Id. at 398. Insome of the cases equitable relief has been refused on other
discretionary grounds, e. g., City of New York v.Pine, 185 U. S.93 (1902).
The use of the conditional injunction as a means of effecting a complete settlement of the problem is also illustrated in this case.
75. Sanitary Dist. of Chicago v. United States, 266 U. S. 405 (1925).
76. United States v. Rio Grande Irr. Co., 174 U. S. 690, 708 (1889).
77. 30 STAT. 1151 (1899), 33 U. S. C. § 403 (1946), Ilhenny v.Broussard, 172
La. 895, 135 So. 669 (1931).
78. Pound v. Turck, 95 U. S. 459 (1878); Egan v. Hart, 165 U. S. 188
(1897) ; accord, Leitch v. Chicago, 41 F. 2d 728 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 282
U. S.891 (1930).
79. 49 STAT. 1570 (1936), 33 U. S. C. § 701a (1946); 58 STAT. 887 (1944), 33
U. S. C. § 701-1 (1946), as amended, 61 STAT. 501 (1947), 33 U. S.C.§ 701-1
(Supp. 1952). See 3 REPORT, supra note 70, c.4.
80. See Sumnary of the Central and Southern Florida Flood Control Project, Water Survey and Research Paper No. 4,Fla. State Bd. of Conservation,
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made available by such projects comes within the jurisdiction of the
Secretary of the Army. 8 '
Concluding this consideration of federal water law, there is one
more valuable lesson to be studied by our Southeastern states. That
lesson may be drawn from the pattern of settlement of interstate
water disputes. We have already briefly considered the judicial
handling of this subject. The Constitution, however, provides for
interstate
another method of working out such disputes -through
agreements or compacts.8 2 Such compacts, worked out between the
states, along with machinery for their application, usually provide
a much more satisfactory method of settlement than does sporadic
litigation over isolated points of disagreement.83 Similarly, in intrastate disputes contractual arrangements between the parties will often
provide the most workable solution, especially if sufficient foresight
is exercised to work out such arrangements as a part of planning
for operations requiring extensive use of water. 84 And it is well
to remember that, if it becomes necessary to seek judicial enforcement
of agreements through a suit for specific performance, the balance
of convenience doctrine will be available in most of our jurisdictions
as a tempering factor in the granting of such relief.85
TH4 CALIVORNIA EXPIENCE
It must be realized that the doctrine of reasonable use has one
serious practical defect. While under it an injunction will be refused to one not actually or prospectively using the available water,
if lower riparian owners should decide to make such use and should
take definite steps toward that end, they would then be entitled to
Aug. 1950. For a note on the state law related to this problem see Note,
Ifaters: Surface Water Drainage, 2 U. or FLA. L. REV. 392 (1949).
81. 58 STAT. 890 (1944), 33 U. S. C. § 709 (1946), as amended, 61 STAT.
501 (1947), 33 U. S. C. § 709 (Supp. 1952).
82. U. S. CONsT. Art. I, § 10, "No State shall, without the consent of the
Congress ... enter into any agreement or Compact with another State .... .
Congress has given blanket consent to the states to negotiate compacts for the

control of pollution, 62

STAT.

1155, 1156 (1946), 33 U. S. C. 466a(c) (Supp.

1952). See Watson, Ohio River Compact and Other Interstate Agreements, 41
J. At. WATER WORKS Ass'N, 18 (1949). In Hinderlider v. LaPlatte River &
Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U. S. 92, 106 (1938), the Court points' out that
Congress had as of 1938 consented to 15 compacts for apportionment of waters
in interstate streams. See also 3 REPoRT, supra note 70, at 64-70.
83. See Frankfurter and Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitutio ,
A Study in Interstate Adjustments, 34 YALE L. J. 685, 707 (1925).
84. See Powell and Bacon, Magnitude of Industrial Demand for Process
Water, 42 J. Am. WATER WORKs Ass'N 777, 785 (1950). Such planning may
be encouraged by wise state legislation, e. g., through the authorization of cooperative irrigation districts, as in Florida. See FLA. STAT. §611.38 (1951).
85. See note 11 supra.
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a fair share of the water, even though this might seriously impede

beneficial uses already being made by upper riparian owners. 8 6 Fear
of being cut off from such uses in turn may discourage upper riparians from establishing extensive irrigation systems or using the water

to irrigate adjacent riparian lands and thus result in failure to make
87
full use of the available supply.
Application of the prior appropriation doctrine can solve this problem, since once an appropriator begins diverting water of a stream,
he gains a right to continue indefinitely. Unless, however, some
method is provided for divesting a prior appropriator of his right
to continue diversions when changed conditions demand the prior
appropriation doctrine may eventually become as stifling to progress as the older natural flow theory.8 8 The California experience
with the latter doctrine may serve to illustrate this point.89
In California early judicial application of the natural flow theory
in favor of lower riparian owners who required the full flow of mountain streams in spring and early summer for flooding and fertilizing their lowland pastures had resulted in shutting down the large
hydraulic gold mining industry of the 1880's.90 But by the 1920's
it had become apparent that requiring that all the water be left in

86. Thus in an earlier decision on the Kansas and Colorado dispute the

Supreme Court, while denying Kansas equitable relief, provided that its petition could be renewed upon a showing of real injury. Kansas v. Colorado, 206
U. S. 46, 117, 118 (1907).
87. See Busny, supra note 53, at ix. This difficulty can be obviated to some
extent by contractual arrangements between the riparians similar to the interstate water compacts. See p. 174 supra.

88. The validity of this criticism is recognized by A. P. Black, Head Professor

of Chemistry, Univ. of Florida, a former president of the American Waterworks Association, who supports legislative adoption of the prior appropriation
doctrine in the area of ground water regulation. As Black puts it, in Basic
Concepts in Ground Water Law, 39 J. Am. WATrM WORKS Ass'N 989, 994
(1947), "This principle [of prior appropriation] without question offers the
greatest protection to large investors whose appropriations are dependent upon
an adequate supply of water. On the other hand, it inevitably leads at times
to the use of water by a senior appropriator which would have been better used
by a junior, and we are faced again with the fact that the rule of reasonable
use must have a place in the administration of the doctrine".
89. For an excellent article on this experience see Wiel, Fifty Years of Water
Law, 50 HARv. L. REv. 252 (1936).
90. Woodruff v. North Bloomfield Gravel Mining Co., 18 Fed. 753, 756, 774
(C. C. D. Cal. 1884); People v. Gold Run Ditch & Mining Co., 66 Cal. 138,
4 Pac. 1152 (1884). The crm of these "debris" cases was not so much di-

version or appropriation as the prevention of pollution, but another famous

case of the same era, Lux v. Haggin, 69 Cal. 255, 4 Pac. 919 (1884), aff'd,
69 Cal. 255, 10 Pac. 674 (1886), led to the recognition of the strict natural
flow theory as the law governing private riparians in California. The court,
in a 200-page opinion, rejected the prior appropriation doctrine as to such
owners, preferring to protect the "property rights" of the lower riparians with-

out regard to relative value of the use to which the water was being put. See
Wiel, Fifty Years of Water Law, 50 HARv. L. R v. 252, 254-259 (1936).
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the streams for the valley cattle interests was wasteful when much
of it could be better utilized for year-round irrigation in the uplands.
The upshot was a constitutional amendment in 1928 declaring that
"reasonable use" was the test for use of water resources in California. 9 1
It was, of course, predicted that the new doctrine would be impossible of administration, 92 but by taking the position that reasonable
use does not necessarily mean equal use by all riparians, 93 and refusing injunctions in favor of damages on the balance of convenience
theory, 94 or applying the de minimis principle to "nuisance value"
claims, 95 the California Court, using a reference procedure under
which it obtains the advice of the State Department of Public Works
through the State Engineer in difficult cases, 96 has made the amendment work. Of course, if the injunction is refused the inhjured party
always has his action at law for damages, but parties with no real in97
jury have found the juries no more sympathetic than the chancellors.
91. CAT CoNSr. Art. XVI, § 3; see Peabody v. Vallejo, 2 Cal. 2d 351, 366,
40 P. 2d 486, 490 (1935). This rule of reasonable use is modified to the extent that California continues to recognize the right of prior appropriation as
applied to waters of streams in the public domain, a right established by legislation in 1872. In addition, excess flow in watercourses above the quantities to
which riparian and other lawful rights attach have been held to be public
waters of the state and hence subject to its control and regulation. Meridian
v. San Francisco, 13 Cal. 2d 424, 90 P. 2d 537 (1939). See 3 REPORT, supra
note 70, at 715-721.
92. "If every person owning land over a water-bearing area shall be permitted to share with every other person wherever he shall see fit to drive his
well, it is very probable, if not quite certain, that as the process of development goes on, many, if not all, will find themselves restricted in their use of
the water they have brought to the surface to the extent of ruination". Justesen v. Olsen, 86 Utah 158, 169-170, 40 P. 2d 802, 807 (1935).
93. Peabody v. Vallejo, 2 Cal. 2d 351, 375, 40 P. 2d 486, 495 (1935). The
Supreme Court has taken a similar position concerning the application of the
equitable apportionment doctrine in the interstate cases. As the Court put it
in Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U. S. 660, 670 (1931): ".

.

. such dis-

putes are to be settled on the basis of equality of right. But this is not to say
that there must be an equal division of the waters of an interstate stream
among the states through which it flows. It means that the principles of right
and equity shall be applied having regard to the 'equal level or plane on which
all states stand, in point of power and right, under our constitutional system'
and that, upon a consideration of all the pertinent laws of the contending
States and all other relevant facts, this Court will determine what is an equitable apportionment of the use of such waters". See Wiel, Fifty, Years of
Water Law, 50 HARv. L. REV. 252, 279 (1936), Theories of Water Law, 27
HARv. L. REV. 530, 536, 540 (1914).
94. Peabody v. Vallejo, supra note 93; Collier v. Merced Irr. Dist., 213 Cal.
554, 2 P. 2d 790 (1931).
95. Chow v. Santa Barbara, 217 Cal. 673, 22 P. 2d 5 (1933); see Wiel,
Fifty Years of Water Law, 50 HARV. L. Ray. 252, 286 (1936).
96. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 2000-2050; see Waldo, Evaluation of California
Water Riqht Law, 18 So. CAnIF. L. Rv. 267, 268-269 (1945).
97. Wiel, Fifty Years of Water Law, 50 HARv. L. Rrv. 252, 288, n. 93 (1936).
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CONCLUSION

Any system of water law, if it is to serve the Southeast over the
years, must be sufficiently flexible to adjust itself to the changing
social needs of the times. Inability to so adjust the natural flow
doctrine in California led to its downfall in that state. It had provided certainty at the expense of flexibility or epieikia, and, like other
mechanical concepts of jurisprudence, it eventually fell of its own

weight.
Perhaps a new version of the prior appropriation rule, applied under the guidance of a wise administrator, may be the solution in
states like South Carolina and Georgia, where the balance of convenience doctrine is not available as a tool to aid in developing the
reasonable use theory. 98 But one thing is certain: flexibility is essential if we are to build a system of water law that will stand for future
generations. The reasonable use theory allows for necessary revisions. 99 Moreover, the California experience has demonstrated
that the reasonable use theory, applied by a judiciary working with
a technically qualified state agency and free to control that theory
through the balance of convenience doctrine, can provide a workable solution of the growing demand. 10 0 It would, therefore, seem
reasonable to conclude that, in those of our Southeastern states where
the balance of convenience doctrine is now accepted, that doctrine
can become a most valuable tool in the construction of a sound water
law keyed to the demands of a modern democratic society.
98. See notes 46, 48 supra.

99. New Jersey v. New York, 283 U. S. 336, 348 (1931); see 2

WVIL,

WATER RIGHTS IN THE WESTIRN STATES §§ 752, 769 et seq. (3d ed. 1911).
It may be argued that the prior appropriation theory also allows for revision,
inasmuch as appropriative rights may be lost by non-use, but loss by non-use
and surrender of such rights in favor of a more reasonable use in view of
changed social conditions are two entirely different methods of change.
100. A complete revision of local water law is probably unnecessary in most
of our Southeastern states, where water supplies are relatively abundant. A
more likely development is legislative revision as applied to certain critical
areas where shortages are likely to occur. Such statutes might well be patterned after recent ground water legislation in New Jersey and some of our
Western states. See ARiz. Cons ANN. §§ 75-145 et seq. (Cum. Supp. 1939) ;
NEv. ComP. LAWS §§ 7993.11-7993.21 (Supp. 1949); N. I. STAT. ANN. tit.
58, §§ 4A-1 to 4A-4 (
). See also CGirrent Developments in Ground Water
Law, 41 J. Am. WATER WoRKs Ass'N 1002 (1949). If such area-type legislation is enacted, provision for reasonable use in critical areas under the immediate supervision of a state water control commission would seem more in
harmony with existing water law in the Southeast, and consequently more
likely of enactment, than a change to the prior appropriation doctrine.

Published by Scholar Commons, 1952

19

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 5 [1952], Art. 10

ADDENDUM
RIPARIAN LANDS

Should the courts and legislatures in the Southeastern states have
under consideration defining riparian lands and consider limiting
these to the smallest tract held under one title in the chain of title
leading to the present owner, then the following citations may be
of some help:
It appears that the first statement of this limitation in the form
above given was made by the California Supreme Court, in Rancho
Santa Margaritav. Vail, 11 Calif. (2d) 501, 529, 81 Pac. (2d) 533
(1938). However, much earlier, Wiel on Water Rights, sec. 771,
states that the California decisions "lean toward holding the extent
of riparian land to the smallest parcel touching the stream in the
history of the title while in the hands of the present owner". This
was written in 1911.
The statement in the Santa Margarita case, supra, however, is
a logical summation of the results of various California decisions. The
court in that case cited only one authority -Boehmer v. Big Rock
Irr. Dist., 117 Calif. 19, 48 Pac. 908, in which 14 quarter-sections
of public land were granted to the same party, but by separate patents,
each based on a separate entry. Some parcels were contiguous to
a stream; others were contiguous to the (riparian) parcels but not
to the stream. The court held that for the purpose of determining
riparian rights, there were 14 distinct tracts, and that "mere contiguity cannot extend a riparian right which is appurtenant to one
quarter section to another, though both are now owned by the same
person". The court relied on Lux v. Haggin, 69 Calif. 255, 424425, 10 Pac. 674, 773-774 (1886), wherein it was held that certificates of purchase issued by the California State Land Office were
admissible as showing ownership of land riparian to a watercourse,
but that "All the sections or fractional sections mentioned in any
one certificate constitute a single tract of land. If, however, lands
have been granted by patent, and the patent was issued on the cancellation of more than one section, the patent can operate by relation
(for the purpose of this suit) to the date of those certificates only,
the lands described in which border on the stream". This has been
relied upon in subsequent cases as a holding that the riparian right
extends only to land embraced within a single grant from the government, and that such grant establishes the initial riparian title; and
178

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol5/iss5/10

20

Maloney: The Balance of Convenience Doctrine in the Southeastern States, P
ADDENDUM

as leading to the conclusion that annexation of a detached parcel to
a parcel contiguous to the stream cannot extend the riparian right
of the latter even if physical conditions were favorable to use of
the water on the previously detached parcel.
Wiel severely criticizes the reliance upon Lzix v. Haggin, supra, for
this principle, and strongly disapproves of the principle, which he
says did not exist either at the common law or the civil law. See
particularly secs. 770-772. Notwithstanding his disapproval, and the
esteem in which his work has been generally held by the California
Supreme Court, that court has since reaffirmed its adherence to the
principle. (See Miller & Lux v. James, 180 Calif. 38, 51, 179 Pac.
174, 180 (1919) ; Title Insurance & Trust Co. v. Miller & Lux, 183
Calif. 71, 82, 190 Pac. 433, 437 (1920).)
A riparian tract in California, then, cannot exceed the original
grant from the government, regardless of watershed limitations.. It
can be reduced from the area originally so granted, but cannot be
extended after a reduction. This rule is based upon various decisions of the California courts, of which some important ones follow:
It is stated in Anaheim Union Water Co. v. Fuller, 150 Calif. 327,
331, 88 Pac. 978 (1907), that:
If the owner of a tract abutting on a stream conveys to another
a part of the land not contiguous to the stream, he thereby cuts
off. the part so conveyed from all participation in the use of the
stream and riparian rights therein, unless the conveyance declares the contrary. Land thus conveyed and severed from the
stream can never regain the riparian right, although it may
thereafter be reconveyed to the person who owns the part abutting on the stream, so that the two tracts are again held in
one ownership.
The finality of such. severance is repeated in Rancho Santa Margarita v. Vail, 11 Calif. (2d) 501, 538, 81 Pac. (2d) 533 (1938).
And see Hudson v. Dailey, 156 Calif. 617, 624-625, 105 Pac. 748
(1909).
Preservation of the riparian right in a parcel thus detached from
a riparian tract and from contiguity to the stream may be effected
by the deed of conveyance, even as against other riparian owners
(Miller & Lux v. J. G. James Co., 179 Calif. 689, 691-692, 178 Pac.
716 (1919). See also Strong v. Baldwin, 154 Calif. 150, 156-157, 97
Pac. 178 (1908) ; Hudson v. Dailey, 156 Calif. 617, 624, 105 Pac. 748
(1909).) Likewise, if the circumstances are such as to show that
the parties so intended, or such as to raise an estoppel (see Hudson
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v. Dailey, supra, at 156 Calif. 624). It is preserved in a partition
decree (Verdugo Canyon Water Co. v. Verdugo, 152 Calif. 655,
662-663, 93 Pac. 1021 (1908) ; Frazee v. Railroad Commission, 185
Calif. 690, 693-694, 201 Pac. 921 (1921); see Strong v. Baldwin,
supra, at 154 Calif. 156-157), even when the decree is silent as to
the division of riparian rights (Rancho Santa Margarita v. Vail,
supra, 11 Calif. (2d) at 540). And preservation is effected by conveyance of the riparian right to a mutual irrigation company and
sale of parcels of land to individuals, accompanied by their proportional part of the mutual company stock (Copeland v. Fairview Land
&' Water Co., 165 Calif. 148, 161, 131 Pac. 119 (1913).)
It would follow, it would seem, that only the smallest tract held
under one title in the chain of titles leading to the present owner
could claim riparian rights. The reduction in area, of course, relates to recession toward the stream. The rule would not be affected
if A were to purchase riparian tracts B and C from separate owners
D and E. It would apply independently to tracts B and C, A being
simply the "present owner" of both tracts.
In other states there are very few pertinent decisions.
A few citations follow:
Oregon - Jones v. Conn, 39 Oreg. 30, 39-41, 64 Pac. 855, 65 Pac.
1068 (1901), states the view that an owner of land contiguous to a
stream should be entitled to riparian rights "without regard to the
extent of his land, or from whom or when he acquired his title".
In view of the decline and fall of riparianism in Oregon, this statement is interesting but not of practical import.
Washington - Yearsley v. Cater, 149 Wash. 285, 288-289, 270
Pac. 804 (1928), holds that a parcel of land detached from a riparian
tract and no longer touching the stream thereby loses its riparian
status; and that a tract, not riparian when title is acquired, cannot
be made riparian by coming under the ownership of the owner of
land lying between it and the stream.
Nebraska- Riparian rights are limited to land acquired by a
single entry or purchased from the government (Crawford Co. v'.
Hathaway, 67 Nebr. 325, 93 N. W. 781 (1903) ; McGinley v. Platte
Valley Public Power & Irr. Dist., 132 Nebr. 292, 297, 271 N. W.
864 (1937).) The right cannot be enlarged or extended by acquisition of adjoining lands (Crawford Co. v. Hathaway, supra, 67 Nebr.
at 353).
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Kansas- Riparian land is confined to the watershed, but within
that physical limit it is not controlled "by the accidental matter of
governmental subdivisions of the land" (Clark v. Allaman, 71 Kans.
206, 244-245, 80 Pac. 571 (1905).)
Texas-The riparian right cannot extend beyond the original
land survey, and "is restricted to land the title of which is acquired
by one transaction" (Watkins Land Co. v. Clenents, 98 Tex. 578,
585, 86 S. W. 733 (1905).
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